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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A PROGRAM RESTRICTING
THE NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL FISHERMEN IN THE
COASTAL WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES
One basic characteristic of a workable constitution is its sucepti-
bility to varied interpretation in light of changing public needs. Leg-
islation of questioned constitutional validity when enacted may with-
stand judicial scrutinization under contemporary constitutional stan-
dards.' This proposition is relevant to the constitutional analysis of
a program restricting the number of commercial fishermen in the
marine fisheries of the United States.
The Biological and Economic Goals
The United States is a coastal nation with a fair abundance of
marine fishery resources. Nevertheless, marine fisheries, a common
property natural resource,2 are not inexhaustible.' As protein needs
become more demanding, fishing efforts intensify, and depletion of
fish stock is the inevitable result. If the depletion rate exceeds the
maximum sustainable yield,4 fish stocks tend toward extinction.'
Thus, the biological goal is maintenance of maximum sustainable
yield, and the means may vary between restricting the fishing area,
shortening the season, limiting the total catch, or perhaps regulating
1. Compare Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963), and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), with United States
v. Darby Lbr., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
2. The common property nature of ocean fish derives from the traditional notion
of "freedom of the high seas," and the theory that fish are owned by no one prior to
reducing them to possession. See Convention on the High Seas, T.I. A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 (1958). Consideration must also be given to the territorial sea principle
which accords coastal nations ownership rights over a portion of the ocean adjacent to
its coast. The principle includes the right to exclude others from taking fish within the
area. In many instances the exclusive fishery zone extends twelve nautical miles from
shore. This is true in the United States zone since Congress enacted the Exclusive
Fisheries Zone Act (16 U.S.C. § 1091-94 (1966)). Under our system of government, the
coastal states presently maintain territorial control of the sea adjacent to its borders
seaward for three nautical miles. The federal government is accorded regulatory con-
trol of the remaining nine, although there has been no enabling legislation from Con-
gress to establish fishing regulations within this area. Until Congress decides to act,
the individual states may regulate the fishing activities of its own citizens beyond the
three mile zone under the principle recognized by the Supreme Court in Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
3. For a concise discussion of the biological and economic objectives relating to
fish stocks in the high seas and coastal waters, see G. KNIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
FISHERIES (1973) (Louisiana State University Marine Science Teaching Aid).
4. The term "maximum sustainable yield" may be defined as the determination
of the most fish that can be harvested from a given stock while still maintaining a level
which allows an equivalent harvest from year to year.
5. F.T. CHRISTY & A. ScOrr, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES ch. II
(1964).
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the type of gear.' A viable management scheme is difficult to con-
struct, owing, in part, to the common property character of the re-
source, our federal system of government, and the fact fish do not
honor artificial boundaries. A shift of emphasis from biological to
economic goals causes managerial obstacles to multiply.
A laissez faire approach to marine fisheries management serves
to produce lower individual returns, notwithstanding a possible over-
all increase in fishing profits. Uncontrolled entry into the commercial
fishing industry coupled with a fixed fish harvest, (e.g., the maxi-
mum sustainable yield), results in a relatively unprofitable commer-
cial fishing industry. Moreover, there are no incentives for fishermen
to voluntarily curb fishing efforts in the interest of greater future
yields, if they are unable to profit from the sacrifice.7 If economic
efficiency is to be considered a legitimate marine fisheries resource
management objective, concern need be directed not only to sustain-
ing maximum physical yield, but also to harvesting it in the most
efficient manner. Traditional methods, restricting the use of efficient
gear or shortening the season, cannot attain economic efficiency and
tend to promote part-time fishing, extreme market fluctuations and
storage difficulties.
The goal of economic sustainable yield whereby a minimum
number of fishermen are permitted to produce at maximum economic
peak can be approached through a program preventing excessive
entry.' The concept of limited entry is not new.' The Japanese have
used it in high seas fishing since the 1940's.11 Canada recently initi-
ated a limited entry scheme in its salmon fishing industry," l and this
6. Buckingham, How Can Harvest Regulations Be Developed to Benefit Rather
Than Hinder Commercial and Sport Fishing Efficiency?, PROCEEDINGS FROM OREGON'S
1971 NATIONAL DISCUSSION FORUM, Panel No. 3, 112 (1971).
7. Suppose local menhaden fishermen agree upon a reduction of fishing efforts in
order to produce larger future yields. After the time has elapsed, and reduction proves
fruitful, other individuals commence entry into the industry to take advantage of the
fine harvest. Those who had made the original sacrifice are unable to enjoy any in-
creased return, and are unlikely to make any similar voluntary sacrifice in the future.
8. One authority concludes that limited entry may be the only viable means of
fulfilling an economic objective in marine fisheries resource management. F.T. CHRISTY
& A. SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES (1964). See especially R.
Fletcher, Legal Analysis, SALMON GEAR LIMITATION IN NORTHERN WASHINGTON WATERS,
(U. of Wash. Publications in Fisheries, N.S. Vol. II, No. 1, 52 (1963)). See also F.
Cameron, Constitutional Impediments to Limited Entry Fisheries Legislation, U. of
R.I. (1973).
9. "Limited entry in fisheries, de jure or de facto, has been with us for many years-
decades-centuries, but it is only recently that this label has been widely applied to the
concept." Herrington, What Are the Real Objectives of Limited Entry?, PROCEEDINGS
FROM OREGON'S 1971 NATIONAL DISCUSSION FORUM, Panel No. 3, 100 (1971).
10. E. Keen, Limited Entry: The Case of the Japanese Tuna Fishery (Unpub-
lished article in San Diego State College Library).
I1. Campbell, Are Canada's Limited Entry Programs in the Salmon & Lobster
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year marks the commencement of an elaborate limited entry program
in the state of Alaska. 2 Limited entry is simply a means not an end.
Abused, it could establish a privileged class, but properly adminis-
tered it has the potential to provide the individual fisherman an
opportunity to obtain a reasonable economic return,13 obviate present
inefficiency, offer the consumer quality products at lower costs, in-
crease governmental revenues, 4 and lighten the burden of agencies
responsible for fisheries management and law enforcement.
The Constitutional Problem
Federal Considerations
Owing to our federal system of government, the constitutionality
of a limited entry program may depend on which level of government
enacts it. For example, implementing a limited entry scheme on a
national scale eliminates the necessity of meeting state constitutional
requirements. Moreover, as a general rule the Supreme Court tends
to take a more tolerant approach to economic regulation of activities 5
than do state courts." A purely state instigated measure may face
various obstacles depending upon whether the program owes its ori-
Fisheries Successful?, PROCEEDINGS FROM OREGON'S 1971 NATIONAL DISCUSSION FORUM,
Panel No. 3, 10-8.
12. ALAS. GEN. STAT. § 16-43.010-43-300 (1962).
13. Dr. James Crutchfield estimates that in the halibut industry alone "addi-
tional savings of something in the neighborhood of $6 to $7 million a year to the
American fleet alone could be realized if the fishery could be made into a full-time
fishery for a much smaller number of boats." PROCEEDINGS FROM OREGON'S 1971
NATIONAL DISCUSSION FORUM, at 105 (1971).
14. An increase in individual income for the fisherman as a result of a limited
entry measure would place the fishermen in higher income brackets, and thus raise
additional state and federal tax revenue. It would not seem that the issuance of fewer
fishing permits will mean a necessarily lower revenue to the state, since it is probable
that license fees will increase.
15. The Supreme Court has taken a permissive attitude in the police power area.
For example, in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), involving the constitution-
ality of a slum clearance program in the District of Columbia, the Court describes
pervasiveness of the police power as "broad and inclusive." The diverse elements such
as "[plublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these
are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police
power . . . [yjet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it."
Viewed in this light, the concept is simply the recognition that a state has the power
to pass any measure provided it does not run afoul of the federal or state constitution.
In Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D.C. Ore. 1969), the court applied this
principle to fisheries resources management and concluded "[t]he state may regulate
fishing . . . to achieve a wide variety of management or 'conservation' objectives. Its
selection of regulation to achieve these objectives is limited only by its own organic
laws and the standards of reasonableness required by the Fourteenth Amendment."
16. Compare Day Brite Light., Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), with
19741
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gin primarily to the legislature or a state agency. Separation and
delegation of power concepts are often given strict interpretations by
state courts, which have a tendency to strike down economic mea-
sures beyond the "police powers of the state."'" State constitutional
standards may be avoided when a congressionally sanctioned inter-
state compact agency establishes the program. Article I, Section 10,
Clause 3 of the federal constitution provides "[n]o state shall, with-
out the consent of Congress. . . enter into any agreement or compact
with another State . . ... "In Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Comm.,' the Supreme Court, in holding that by entering into an
interstate compact a state had waived its immunity against suit
under the compact, reaffirmed the view that "[tihe construction of
a Compact sanctioned by Congress . . . presents a federal question
• . . the meaning . . . on which this Court has final say . . . [and]
[w]hile we show deference to state law in construing a compact,
state law as pronounced in prior adjudications and rulings is not
binding.""9 It is thus possible that the Court will uphold a limitation
of the number of fishermen when the program is initiated by an
agency created by interstate compact, notwithstanding state judicial
interpretation that the action violates its state constitution. West
Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims" lends support to this view. The Court
there reversed a state court decision holding the Ohio River Valley
Compact void under its state constitution. Especially relevant is the
concurrence of Mr. Justice Jackson who concluded that a state enter-
ing into an interstate agreement consented to by Congress was es-
topped from denying the compact's validity. However, express provi-
sions of a state constitution which forbid the restriction of fishing
rights would prevent legislative ratification of the compact.
Banjavich v. Louisiana Lic. Bd. for Mar. Divers, 237 La. 467, 111 So. 2d 505 (1959).
See also Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
17. Many state constitutions include separation of power and non-delegation of
legislative power provisions. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. III, § 42, 43; GA. CONST. art. I,
§ 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; LA. CONST. art. 2, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6, art. II,
§ 1. Depending on the attitude of the state court, one might be rightly concerned with
court invalidation of a limited entry scheme on an unlawful delegation of power ration-
ale. Judicial history of this sort, if continued, may lead only to an inflexible limited
entry measure, since statutory law per se would have to entirely dictate the program.
See Banjavich v. Louisiana Lic. Bd. for Mar. Divers, 237 La. 467, 111 So. 2d 505 (1959).
18. 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
19. Id. at 278 n.4.
20. 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
[Vol. 34
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Although the individual states have traditionally been accorded
regulatory control over fisheries resources within their respective jur-
isdictions, Congress has the constitutional power to establish a lim-
ited entry measure under the commerce clause. An activity need not
be commercial for Congress to exert its power to protect instruments
of commerce." As the passing of lottery tickets between states," the
transporting of women across state lines for objectives unrelated to
commercial activity,2 the flow of polluted air from state to state,24
and the ranging of cattle across state lines 5 have been held objects
of commerce subject to congressional regulation, migratory fish mov-
ing across state territorial waters constitute a similar movement of
commerce. The commerce power reaches activities affecting com-
merce, notwithstanding their intrastate character, provided the ac-
tivities have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. 6 Congress
might well conclude that the impact of the commercial fishing indus-
try is of a magnitude sufficient to subject it to federal regulation,27
and thereby preempt concurrent state regulations.28 But, since the
21. In United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assoc., the Supreme Court
described commerce as follows: "[nlot only, then, may transactions be commerce
though noncommercial; they may be commerce though illegal and sporadic, and
though they do not utilize common carriers or concern the flow of anything more
tangible than electrons and information." 322 U.S. 533, 549-50 (1944). See also Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
22. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
23. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
24. United States v. Bishop Proc. Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D.C. Md. 1968).
25. Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414 (1926).
26. The "affectation doctrine" has been used by the Supreme Court to sustain
federal regulation of wages and hours of intrastate labor, United States v. Darby
Lumber, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), to control the amount of wheat that a farmer can grow
for his own consumption, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and to prohibit the
use of intrastate extortion in collecting intrastate loans, Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146 (1971).
27. Considering the amount of capital annually invested in commercial fishing,
and that much of the equipment must traverse state lines, not to mention the impact
that other phases of the fishing industry such as packaging, processing, retailing and
advertising have on commerce, it seems justifiable for Congress to conclude that it has
power to regulate the commercial fisheries of the United States.
28. In United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820, 822 (1st Cir. 1902), the court con-
cludes that jurisdiction of "sea-coast" matters are "of a mixed nature, as to which the
state may act until and except so far as the United States intervenes." Although it
might be possible "that state and federal coastal fisheries regulation may coexist," it
would appear to be unfeasible, and even counterproductive to a limited entry measure.
See H.G. Knight & T.V. Jackson, Legal Impediments to the Use of Interstate Agree-
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federal government has not deemed it necessary to regulate the fish-
eries, establishment of a limited entry program will likely stem from
state legislation. This creates the necessity of meeting state as well
as federal constitutional standards.
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether a
limited entry measure would offend any provision of the federal con-
stitution," but the likely obstacles would be the due process and
equal protection clauses. The less often used privileges and immuni-
ties-clause merits review due to its judicial application in cases deal-
ing with fisheries. However, as a general rule legislation is afforded a
presumption of constitutionality, thereby placing upon the attacker
the burden of establishing the constitutional infirmity of the mea-
sure.30
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has experi-
enced a history of chameleon-like construction by the United States
Supreme Court. Like its fifth amendment companion, due process of
law originally served simply as a procedural check on governmental
encroachment upon individual rights." Near the end of the nine-
teenth century the notion that due process imposed substantive limi-
tations on state and federal legislation found favor with a majority
ments in Coordinated Fisheries Management Programs: States in the N.M.F.S.
Southeast Region 35 (1973).
29. In light of Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), the
statement may appear too broad. In Takahashi, a California law barring issuance of
commercial fishing permits to persons "ineligible to citizenship," thereby excluding
resident aliens from earning a living as commercial fishermen, was held unconstitu-
tional. Nevertheless, since the provision was clearly discriminatory on its face and
lacked any economic related management objective, the author believes the statement
is proper.
30. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464 (1957); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1954); Lindsley v. Natural Carb. Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
31. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873), the United
States Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana provision permitting a small number the
exclusive right to maintain slaughter houses within certain areas of Orleans Parish.
With little discussion, the majority rejected the contention that those individuals
excluded were denied due process of law. "[Ulnder no construction of that provision
that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by
the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the butchers of New Orleans
be held a deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision." However,
Justice Bradley did not agree. He thought "the right to choose one's calling is an
essential part of that liberty which it is the object of government to protect." Id. at
116. Justice Bradley felt that any law forbidding individuals from pursuing a lawful
occupation served to "deprive them of liberty as well as property, without due process
of law." Id. at 122. The theory that due process conferred a substantive limitation upon
state regulation of a common calling in particular and economic activity in general was
adopted by the Supreme Court in the early part of this century.
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of the Supreme Court. The concept of "liberty" was extended to
include "the right to live and work where [one] willed" and "to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling. '32 Legislation regulating eco-
nomic activities was struck down as "meddlesome interferences with
the rights of the individual" in violation of due process. 3 Only eco-
nomic activities deemed "affected with a public interest,"'34 consti-
tuted proper subjects of governmental control. The determination as
to what activities fell under the label shifted from a legislative to a
judicial function. 35 The soi-disant Lochner era of excessive judicial
protection of economic activities did not survive the late thirties
32. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
33. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905). During this era of judicial over-
protection of business, the Supreme Court invalidated on due process grounds laws:
(placing a ceiling upon the number of hours that bakers could work), Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); (granting minimum wages to women), Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937); (prohibiting contracts that required abstention from union membership as a
quid pro quo for securing a job), Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); (limiting the number of ice houses), New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); (theater tickets), Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S.
418 (1927) overruled in Gold v. DiCarlo, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); (fees charged by employ-
ment agencies), Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) overruled in Olsen v. Ne-
braska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). Compare the Adkins decision above with Muller v. Ore-
gon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). In Muller, the Court sustained a ten hour ceiling on
working of females on the grounds that a "woman, has always been dependent upon
man." See also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (state law setting a maximum
limit of hours for miners upheld as a valid exercise of police powers owing to the
rationale of concern for health and safety).
34. The concept of "affected with a public interest" appears to have been rather
insignificant in its organic stage. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877), the Court
used the phrase as a standard for determining economic activity properly subject to
regulation by the states. The Court felt that what is affected with a public interest is
"primarily a legislative matter." In upholding the state statute providing for regulation
of amounts that could be charged by grain warehousemen, the Court expressed the
view that "I flor the protection against the legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts." Id. at 134.
35. In Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 524, 535 (1923),
the Court attempted to categorize what businesses are affected with a public interest
as follows: "(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a public grant of
privileges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering
a public service demanded by any member of the public. Such are the railroads, other
common carriers, and public utilities. (2) Certain occupations, regarded as excep-
tional, the public interest attaching to which, recognized from the earliest times, has
survived periods of arbitrary laws by Parliament or colonial legislatures for regulating
all trades and callings. (3) Businesses which, though not public at their inception, may
be fairly said to have risen to be such, and have become subject in consequence to some
government regulation." Meat-packing could not apparently be pigeonholed into one
of the categories. Finally, we observe the Court in New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262 (1932), holding the business of selling ice (before refrigerators were in wide use)
19741
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when the Supreme Court began to take a "hands-off' attitude in the
area of business regulation. Most of the earlier decisions have been
overruled, 9 and the Court appears to have abandoned the notion of
"affected with a public interest.""7 Contemporary judicial language
to the effect that "even a legitimate occupation may be restricted or
prohibited in the public interest"38 portrays a strikingly varied ap-
proach. Perhaps the present Supreme Court attitude is best exempli-
fied by the language in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co."5 The majority
concludes:
[T]he day is gone when the Court uses the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws regula-
tory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought.'"
was not "clothed with a public interest," and a statute requring individuals that
desired to pursue the calling to secure a permit violated due process. The majority
concluded that such a restriction served "to shut out new enterprises, and thus create
and foster monopolies." Id. at 278. It is noteworthy that the majority in Liebmann
recognized that the protection of natural resources is a matter affected with a public
interest. Mr. Justice Brandeis offered a forceful dissent in Liebmann. He emphasized
that ice at that time was a "household necessity," and expressed the view that there
exists nothing in the constitution requiring "every calling which has been common
shall ever remain so." Id. at 303.
36. See note 33 supra. In Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), the Court held a provision forbidding denial of employ-
ment on the basis of union membership not offensive to due process. The Court de-
clared the "Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage constitutional doctrine" was no longer
followed, and the judiciary had returned to the "principle that states have power to
legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial
and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal
constitutional prohibition or valid federal law." Id. at 536.
37. The doctrine of "affected with a public interest" appears to have been dis-
carded in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). In upholding state regulation of
milk prices against due process attack, the Court made it clear that a "state may
regulate a business in any of its aspects . . . [and] adopt whatever economic policy
• . . reasonably.., deemed to promote public welfare." Id. at 537.
38. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 632 (1951). In Breard, an ordinance pro-
hibiting door-to-door solicitation was challenged on the grounds, inter alia, that it
deprived the individual of his "means of livelihood." The Court upheld the city ordi-
nance, and cited with approval the dissent of Justice Brandeis in Liebmann.
39. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
40. Id. at 488. One commentator concludes that the decision in Lee Optical
"places an impossible burden upon the party attacking the law." Comment, 53
N.W.U.L. REV. 13, 24 (1958). It is noteworthy that the organ of the Court was Mr.
Justice Douglas. Just one year before the decision of Lee Optical, Douglas had heralded
"Itihe right to work" as the "most precious liberty that man possesses." Barksy v.
Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954).
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In a more recent opinion,4 the Court reversed a lower court invalida-
tion of a law which prohibited engaging in the debt-adjusting busi-
ness, unless accessory to the practice of law. In overruling an earlier
opinion construing due process to prevent state prohibition of "useful
business" not found "inherently immoral or dangerous to public wel-
fare,"42 the Court made clear its function was not to "sit as a 'super-
legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation.' ""
The brief excursion into the constitutional history of the due
process clause is not intended as an exposition on judicial reaction
to a limited entry program in an earlier age, but concerns predictabil-
ity; does a law restricting the number of fishermen for the purpose of
accomplishing economic optimization in the commercial fisheries
violate due process of law? The contemporary notion of substantive
due process, at least in the zone of economic regulation, is grounded
upon judicial unwillingness to undermine legislative determinations
as to the more expedient means of securing the practical needs of the
public. In applying the test of legitimate purpose and rational means,
the means need not be the only course of action open to the legislature
for realization of a proper goal,44 nor will the Court attempt to deter-
mine whether a particular measure is a wise one. 5 Thus, if the need
of economic optimization in marine fisheries for the benefit of the
general welfare overshadows any restriction of individual liberty that
may result from a limited entry measure, the legislation ought to
withstand the most rigorous due process attack. 8
The decision in Corsa v. Tawes47 is perhaps indicative of the
outcome of a challenge to a limited entry program on due process
grounds. The case involved a challenge to a Maryland provision pro-
41. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
42. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
43. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
44. In an earlier time the Supreme Court might well have applied the principle
of the "less-restrictive-alternative" to a limited entry measure, and invalidated the
provisions on the grounds that a law could be implemented to deal with the problem
in a less restrictive way. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 8 (1927).
However, since Lee Optical and Ferguson it appears unlikely that such a standard
would be utilized by the Court.
45. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348
U.S. 483, 488 (1955); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 222 (1949).
46. It may be argued that a limited entry law resulting in the denial of a license
to individuals presently enjoying a commercial fishing business, and thus, lowering the
value of the fishermen's vessel and equipment constitutes a taking of property without
due process of law. Assuming the contention has merit, the statute might include a
provision authorizing the state to buy back the equipment, thereby satisfying the
requirement of just compensation for taking of property by government.
47. 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1957), aff'd, 355 U.S. 37 (1957).
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hibiting use of purse nets in taking menhaden. Since this nonedible
fish cannot be taken economically without using purse nets, the law
effectively eliminated commercial menhaden fishing in the area.
Nonresident fishermen attacked the measure on the grounds, inter
alia, that it deprived them of liberty and property without due pro-
cess of law. The state defended the measure as a proper means of
protecting edible fish and promoting sport fishing. The lower court
sustained the provision which was later affirmed by the Supreme
Court without opinion. The decision is especially pivotal owing to its
sanctioning of an economic goal in fisheries resource management.
Decision as to whether the State's interest requires a prohibition
of all purse netting . . . in order to protect sport fishing . . . is
also a legislative prerogative. It is a legitimate objective for the
State to sponsor sport fishing and the economic interest depen-
dent upon it."
The court's willingness to permit pursuit of economic objectives in
fishing laws is a clean break with historical notions which place
pseudo-constitutional limits on the power of a state under the thesis
that the measure is "beyond the police powers." Corsa illustrates the
contemporary position that state legislatures "are entitled to their
own standard of the public welfare."4
A limited entry program necessitates classification of individu-
als; those permitted to fish commercially and those excluded. The
Federal Constitution prohibits state denial of equal protection of the
laws to individuals within its jurisdiction.'" Depending primarily on
48. Id. at 776.
49. Day Brite Light., Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). In Day Brite the
Court sustained a state law providing that employees be given work time off without
loss of pay in order to vote. See also the language of the Court in Schmidinger v.
Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913) to the effect that determination of matters concerning
regulation of trades and businesses are for the legislature. But see Puyallup Tribe v.
Washington Game Dept., 94 S. Ct. 32 (1973). In Puyallup Tribe the Court, in striking
down a regulation that discriminated against Indian fishermen, posited that fishing
"rightisi can be controlled by the need to conserve a species." (Emphasis added.)
This language could be interpreted to mean that restricting the number of fishermen
based solely upon an economic objective will not meet the legitimate purpose test of
the present Court. It would seem, however, that the language serves as an illustration
of' the states' regulatory power in the fisheries area. In light of changing judicial atti-
tudes, the use of limited entry in reaching the economic goals of improved individual
returns for fishermen, establishing more efficient fish harvest, and assisting in provid-
ing an expedient way to preserve fish stock appears a reasonable way to reach a
legitimate objective.
50. U.S. CONST. amendment XIV, § 1. No comparable provision exists expressly
prohibiting federal denial of equal protection. However, the same protection is afforded
[Vol. 34
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the nature of the classification, the United States Supreme Court
applies varied standards in resolving equal protection disputes. Leg-
islative classifications based on race,51 nationality or alienage2 are
considered "suspect criteria" subject to rigid judicial scrutiny. To
avoid judicial invalidation of a measure the state must prove the
existence of a "compelling state interest." Similarly restrictions of
"fundamental rights" invoke the "compelling state interest" test.53
The standard more often "applied to state legislation restricting
the availability of employment opportunities" 4 is the less rigorous
"rational basis" test which requires that a classification be reasona-
ble, possess some rational connection to the measure's legitimate
purpose, and treat all within the class alike. The test affords legisla-
tion a presumption of reasonableness,55 and any conceivable facts
justifying the classification will be judicially accepted as the basis for
the classification." In applying this test, the Court has sustained
against equal protection challenges state exclusion of individuals,
except relatives and associates of pilots, from entering the river-boat
piloting trade, 7 prohibition of women bartenders other than the
spouse or female issue of the proprietor, 8 and restrictions on the
selling of nonprescription eyeglasses except certain ready-to-wear
models.5" These decisions lend support to the view that a carefully
the individual with respect to federal encroachment by virtue of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
51. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). In Hunter, a city ordinance permit-
ting approval of race as a basis in housing by majority vote in a city election was held
to offend the equal protection clause. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
52. State laws which deny resident aliens admission to practice law, In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), welfare benefits, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971), and commercial fishing licenses, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334
U.S. 410 (1948), have all been invalidated by the Supreme Court on the basis of equal
protection.
53. For example, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court used
the equal protection clause to strike down a statute requiring a period of residency prior
to eligibility for welfare because it restricted the fundamental right to travel interstate.
54. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). In Dandridge the Court
applied the rational basis test in upholding a Maryland welfare provision which placed
a ceiling on the amount of benefits receivable by any one family against equal protec-
tion challenges that it discriminates against families of large numbers. Justice Stewart,
speaking for the majority, espoused the view that "[in the area of economic and
social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because
the classification by its laws are imperfect." Id. at 485.
55. Lindsley v. Natural Carb. Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
56. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
57. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Com'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
58. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
59. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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designed limited entry measure ought to survive equal protection
standards. 0
In Reetz v. Bozanich6' the Supreme Court had before it the issue
of whether a limited entry scheme violated the equal protection
clause. Alaska adopted a provision which restricted the issuance of
commercial salmon fishing licenses to those who held licenses in the
same area since 1965, or general commercial licenses for three years
since 1960. In a declaratory judgment suit brought by nonresident
fishermen, the lower court struck down the law as violative of the
Federal Constitution and the Alaska constitution's right to fish provi-
sion. The court could "conceive of . . . [no] state of facts which
would justify discrimination in favor of salmon fishers who happened
to have held commercial licenses in three years since 1965," and the
legislation was invalidated as an improper attempt "to establish
monopolistic trade guild[s]" to protect local interests.62 The Su-
preme Court vacated the judgment. Relying upon the doctrine of
federal judicial abstention, the Court held the lower tribunal should
have stayed its hand and permitted state adjudication of the state
constitutional issue, and avoid "possible irritant[s] in the federal-
state relationship.''63
One may properly question the appropriateness of federal ab-
stention where the issue concerns an individual's economic liveli-
hood. Even assuming arguendo the measure violated equal protec-
tion, a full decision on the merits likely would have presented the
60. One of the more obvious limited entry schemes in the area outside of fisheries
is the restriction of liquor licenses. Since the twenty-first amendment grants the states
broad regulatory powers over liquor traffic within its jurisdiction, it may be that
restricting the number of liquor licenses is distinguishable from restricting the number
of fishermen. "However, even in the regulation of the sales of liquor, arbitrary or
unreasonable licensing procedures are in violation of the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment." Parks v. Allen, 409 F.2d 210, 211 (5th Cir.
1969). What appears offensive to equal protection is a classification amounting to
"invidious discrimination." Stephens v. Dennis, 293 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ala. 1968)
(regulation of practice of pharmacy by means of a permit system upheld against attack
on grounds it violates equal protection.) "Invidious discrimination" is no more than a
legal conclusion that the classification of those subject to the measure has no reasona-
ble relation to the end sought to be accomplished. Moreover, exact equality is not a
necessary element in meeting equal protection standards. Nowell v. Illinois, 373 U.S.
420 (1963). It would seem that equal protection will not prove a major obstacle to a
limited entry program for the marine fisheries, provided the drafters approach the
classification in terms of a reasonably thought out and non-arbitrary plan. To be sure,
a limited entry scheme will call for discrimination between diverse individuals. How-
ever, a provision that lacks the taint of "invidiousness" ought to survive.
61. 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
62. Bozanich v. Reetz, 297 F. Supp. 300, 305 (D.C. Alaska 1969).
63. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970).
[Vol. 34
COMMENTS
drafter of a subsequent limited entry scheme judicial guidelines, ob-
viating a possible future invalidation.
Even working without explicit judicial standards, it is safe to
conclude that certain elements can invalidate a limited entry statute;
state exclusion of resident aliens from participating in a limited entry
program, discrimination against nonresident fishermen solely be-
cause of their status, or granting preferential treatment to wealthy
fishermen are all unacceptable criteria in terms of satisfying equal
protection. The question is what permissible criteria may be adopted
in classifying those who shall be accorded the right to fish. It is
reasonable that individuals currently dependent on commercial fish-
ing for a living ought to enjoy a more favorable position than individ-
uals merely considering entry into the fishing trade. The extent of
economic dependency, (whether the fisherman is full or part-time),
the total investment in the trade, the number of years fished, and
one's present ability to fish productively appear suitable standards
of classification. To be sure, the public interest is not furthered by a
program that adds the majority of fishermen to our welfare rolls.
Moreover, restricting the number of catch as opposed to the number
of catchers is a less drastic approach. Simply freezing the number of
commercial fishermen at current levels may be a possible alternative.
Natural attrition and mortality rates would result in an eventual
reduction of numbers under this approach. However, freezing fails to
provide new entrants with the opportunity to fish. Perhaps, this fault
may be diminished by a permit system granting the holder an aliena-
ble property interest." To avoid speculative buying, a provision
might be included limiting one permit per fisherman. Whatever ap-
proach is adopted, it appears essential that the program be a gradual
process producing the least disruption of the socio-economic status
quo. 5
Article IV, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution provides: "The
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several states." The seldom used privileges and
64. The grant of a transferable property right to commercial fishermen would
require continued regulation by the particular agency authorized to implement the
program. A person might be required, for example, to secure clearance from the agency
prior to alienation. Perhaps an option to purchase the permit by the state should
qualify a particular issuance.
65. The economist focusing upon fisheries management objectives desires the
minimum number of fishermen working at the maximum rate of production. From a
sociological perspective this process should most likely be evolutionary. The lawyer
takes a balancing of interest approach, and thus desires the least possible effect on the
individual rights of commercial fishermen; however, he recognizes that often the public
interest may outweigh the policy against restricting individual rights.
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immunities clause is no absolute bar to the states' treating nonresi-
dents differently." In an early opinion by Mr. Justice Washington
sitting in circuit court, "7 a New Jersey statute prohibiting the harvest
of oysters by nonresidents was sustained against attack based on
privileges and immunities. More than a century later the Supreme
Court invalidated a less restrictive, (at least, less restrictive on its
face), commercial fishing provision on privileges and immunities
grounds. South Carolina had passed a measure imposing license fees
of $2,500 on nonresidents trawling for shrimp in its coastal waters
whereas a fee of $25 was imposed on its own citizens. In Toomer v.
Witsell, " the Supreme Court held the law in violation of the privi-
leges and immunities clause, since it discriminated against individu-
als solely because of their nonresident status in order to favor resident
commercial fishers. 9 The Court rejected the argument that the state
necessarily possesses the right to regulate fish within its jurisdiction
under the theory of state ownership of wildlife within its borders.
State ownership, opined the Court, is a "fiction expressive in legal
shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to
preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource."7
Thus, the drafter of a measure restricting the number of fishermen
ought to steer clear of discriminations based on nonresident status,
or chance invalidation on the dual grounds of equal protection and
privileges and immunities.
State Considerations
As noted earlier, a state limited entry program must comply with
state as well as federal constitutional standards. One clear example
is a state constitutional provision granting the right to fish. Fortun-
ately, from a resource management viewpoint, provisions of that na-
ture are rare. Nevertheless, the absence of a specific constitutional
limitation on state control of commercial fishing activities does not
66. "Like many other constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities
clause is not an absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens of other States
where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that
they are citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of treatment in the
many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it. Thus the
inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether
the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them." Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
67. Cortield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 549 (No. 3230) (E.D. Pa. 1823).
68. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
69. See also Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952); Brown v. Anderson, 202
F. Supp. 96 (D.C. Alaska 1962); Steed v. Dodgen, 85 F. Supp. 956 (D.C. Tex. 1949).
70. 334 U.S. at 402.
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assure a measure's success. Judicial attitude concerning state regula-
tion of business appears especially relevant to the constitutional out-
come of a limited entry program. For example, in 1934 the Washing-
ton legislature enacted a law prohibiting use of gill nets for taking
salmon in designated areas of the state. Owing to the belief that it
would be a "grave injustice to deprive them of their livelihood,"
individuals who held commercial gill net permits in 1932 or 1933 were
exempt from the law. In State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse"' the state
supreme court invalidated the measure as violative of the state con-
stitution's privileges and immunities clause, and as offensive to the
federal equal protection clause. Conceding that a provision seeking
to accomplish the objective of fish conservation was legitimate, the
court thought the measure under review served to promote the wel-
fare of a few by an arbitrary and unreasonable method.
[T]hose who were immediately engaged in gill net fishing at the
time of the adoption of the initiative measure would not by that
fact alone be guaranteed a continued means of livelihood, while
those who had been engaged in the same business in 1932, but
who had ceased in the meantime, would be entitled to resume.72
The more recent decision of Washington Kelpers Association v.
State7" exemplified a more permissive attitude in the area of fishery
resource management regulation by the Washington supreme court.
The state enacted legislation prohibiting use of sport gear for com-
mercial salmon fishing in order to improve the overall management
of "both the sport and commercial ocean fisheries." In a declaratory
judgment suit commenced by commercial salmon anglers, the lower
court struck down the law on the basis that it "discriminates within
a class and violates both the state and federal constitution," and as
beyond the police power of the state. In a well reasoned opinion by
Justice Neill, the state supreme court reversed, holding the goal of
"making separate and distinct the sport and commercial fisheries"
to eliminate the circumvention of commercial fishing laws and im-
prove management of resources is a legitimate end, reasonably ac-
complished by classification of "all commercial fishermen."
It is for the legislature-not this court-to determine which
means of solving a particular problem is most appropriate and
consistent with the overall conservation and management scheme
for the salmon resource of this state. The concern of the judiciary
71. 187 Wash. 75, 59 P.2d 1101 (1936).
72. Id. at 83, 59 P.2d at 1105.
73. 81 Wash. 2d 410, 502 P.2d 1170 (1972).
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is only whether-considering the established presumptions ac-
corded to legislation in this area-the regulations in question
have a reasonable and substantial relation to a legitimate object
of the police power, and does not violate any direct or positive
mandate of the state or federal constitutions."
As we gain more knowledge of marine fisheries resources, a highly
complex resource to manage, it appears the judiciary ought to occupy
a less significant role in establishing fishing management policies.
A good illustration of improper use of a limited entry scheme is
the 1949 Texas quota system.7" The state legislature enacted a mea-
sure authorizing the Fish and Game Commission to set limits on the
number of commercial fishing vessel permits issued in a given year
purportedly based upon a standard of preserving the maximum sus-
tainable yield. Fishermen who held commercial vessel licenses on
April 6, 1949 were guaranteed renewal, and no new permits were to
be issued unless and until the prior holders had an opportunity to
renew. The statute included a provision that granted residential pref-
erence in issuing new licenses. On its face the law did not appear to
discriminate between residents and nonresidents with respect to re-
newals. However, since six out of 1450 licenses outstanding on the
cut-off date were held by nonresidents, its discriminatory effect was
clear. The law may have been an attempt to circumvent the holding
of Toomer which had been followed by a federal court sitting in Texas
to invalidate the state's former licensing system." In Dobard v.
State,77 the Texas supreme court invalidated the measure on the
ground it offended the due process clause of the state constitution.
The court might well have reached the same result under the privi-
leges and immunities clause rationale of Toomer since all but one of
the appellants were nonresidents. Instead the court concluded that:
[T]he serious restriction of individual liberty to earn a livelihood
which the present law imposes, together with the vagueness of its
connection with its . . . object of conservation, render it incon-
sistent with due process under our state constitution . . . . It
cannot be said with the least certainty that reduction or increase
of the number of boats, especially without any provision as to the
size or other characteristic of the boats, would reduce or increase
the total number of shrimp taken, still less do so to a degree
commensurate with proper conservation for a given period.
74. Id. at 424, 502 P.2d at 1178.
75. VERNON'S ANN. PENAL CODE art. 934b-2 (1949).
76. Steed v. Dodgen, 85 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Tex. 1949).
77. 147 Tex. 332, 233 S.W.2d 435 (1950).
[Vol. 34
COMMENTS
If allowed to stand, the statute and action already taken under
it are reasonably calculated to perpetuate in effect a monopoly
of commercial fishing for the favored class.78
Favoritism, loose legislative drafting, and conservation objectives
unaccompanied by evidence were fatal defects in the Texas law.
Thus, Dobard is of little precedential value to the attacker of a lim-
ited entry measure under discussion here, and serves only as a re-
minder of the need for a legitimate objective and a reasonable means
of accomplishing the objective.
Louisiana Considerations
Notwithstanding traditional civil law theory that fish are res
nulius, common things "the ownership of which belongs to nobody in
particular,"7 Louisiana statutory law provides "ownership of all fish
. . .remains in the state for the purpose of regulating and controlling
the use and disposition within its borders."8 Although the Civil Code
recognizes "every man has a right freely to fish,"81 there is no express
constitutional right to fish, and thus, legal impediments to limited
entry in Louisiana may be merely illusory. Currently, the state con-
stitution only sanctions biological objectives in fisheries management
by the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission," but does not specifically
preclude legislative implementation of economic goals. In Alfred
Oliver & Co. v. Board of Commissioners,83 the state supreme court
implicitly recognized the legitimacy of legislative use of economic
management criteria. In rejecting the claims of commercial fisher-
78. Id. at 339, 233 S.W.2d at 439, In In re Certificate of Need for Ashton Park
Hospital, Inc., 193 S.E.2d 729 (N.C. 1973), the North Carolina supreme court invalida-
ted a statute authorizing a state agency to deny permits to build hospital facilities if
the agency found that sufficient numbers existed to fulfill present needs. The court
concluded that "[tihe right to work ... is a property right that cannot be taken away
except under the police power of the state in the paramount public interest for reasons
of health, safety, morals, or public welfare." The court attitude in Ashton Park exem-
plifies the retention by state courts of the notion expressive of the Lochner era, now
discarded by the United States Supreme Court.
79. LA. CIv. CODE art. 450.
80. LA. R.S. 56:352 (1950).
81. LA. CIv. COnE art. 453. See also A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 38
at 126 (1967): "statutes asserting state ownership of wildlife are the result of an effort
at conservation of natural resources in the interest of all . ..concession of exclusive
rights to any private person would be hardly conceivable."
82. "The natural resources of the State shall be protected, conserved and replen-
ished landi [flor that purpose . ..oysters, fish and other aquatic life, are hereby
placed under the .. .Commission." LA. CONST. art. VI, § 1(A).
83. 169 La. 438, 125 So. 441 (1929).
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men for lost wages allegedly due to state flood control action, the
Alfred court pointed out that commercial fishermen have no proprie-
tary interest in the fish they were prevented from catching: "Plaintiff
has the privilege, granted by the state . . . but the state had the right
to interfere with the exercise of this privilege . . . in the exercise of
its police power . . . for any . . . cause that it deemed sufficient." 4
Thus, the jurisprudence regards fishing a privilege subject to broad
regulatory control by the state in the exercise of its valid police pow-
ers.
In Banjavich v. Louisiana Licensing Bd. for Marine Divers,5 the
state supreme court posited guidelines for state regulation of eco-
nomic activity:
To justify the State in imposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must initially appear that the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, re-
quire that the business be regulated; the law maker may not,
under the guise of exercising its police power, arbitrarily interfere
with private business or impose unusual or unnecessary restric-
tions upon lawful occupations.m
Although the present court appears more tolerant of state regulation
of business,"7 the Banjavich standard remains substantially unal-
tered. Thus, whether legislation limiting excessive entry in the com-
mercial fisheries can withstand judicial review depends largely on the
degree of utility afforded the general public. If it may be assumed
that legislation which provides an adequate return to fishermen, re-
duces inefficiency, and increases the effectiveness of resource man-
agement benefits the general public, chances of judicial approval are
favorable.
Several cases have held "the pursuit of a legal occupation is a
property right" in Louisiana, whereas fishing has been viewed a
privilege. However, either entitlement is "subordinate to the
84. Id. at 438, 125 So. at 442. See also Louisiana Oyster & Fish Co. v. Police Jury,
126 La. 522, 52 So. 85 (1910).
85. 237 La. 467, 111 So. 2d 505 (1959).
86. Id. at 493 n. 6, Ill So. 2d at 515 n. 6.
87. Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970); Pearce v. Sharbino,
254 La. 143, 223 So. 2d 126 (1969); West v. Winnesboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So. 2d 665
(1967).
88. West v. Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So.2d 655 (1967); Banjavich v. Louisiana
Lic. Bd. for Mar. Divers, 237 La. 467, Ill So. 2d 505 (1959); State v. DeVerges, 153
La. :349, 95 So. 805 (1923); Louisiana Bd. of Exam. in Watchmaking v. Morrow, 188
So. 2d 160 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
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legitimate exercise of the regulatory . . .power of the State."89 So
long as there exist a legitimate purpose and a rational means of
reaching the purpose, the right-privilege distinction is immaterial.
Since legislation is presumed constitutional, and "any doubt must be
resolved in favor of the validity of solemn expressions of legislative
will," ' the challenger to a state program faces a heavy burden.
T. Victor Jackson
89. Louisiana Bd. of Exam. in Watchmaking v. Morrow, 188 So. 2d 160, 162-63
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
90. Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 1082, 241 So. 2d 213, 228 (1970).
